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Efforts to spur growth in sub-Sahara Africa have been intensified amid structural and 
institutional constraints. Tax revenue, the chief source of funding for developmental purposes in 
SSA remains low and unstable. In fact, the SSA sub-region finds it difficult generating tax 
revenue up to 20 per cent of GDP. One factor that has not caught the attention of policymakers in 
terms of its impact on tax revenue performance is exchange rate volatility. Using macrodata 
spanning 1984 to 2017 for 21 countries, we provide empirical evidence from a panel 
autoregressive distributed lag technique to show that exchange rate volatility is directly harmful 
to tax revenue performance, and indirectly through trade openness. 
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Sustained economic growth remains the main goal of policymakers in both emerging and 
advanced countries. This is linked to the relevance and achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which requires that the global economy grows at a rate of at least 3 
per cent per annum. To realize the SDGs, both developed and developing countries require 
concerted efforts to generate enough resources for development. In fact, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognize that mobilizing adequate resources remain the 
backbone of SDGs, which generally seek to end poverty, lessen inequality and injustice as well 
as combat climate change by 2030 (OECD 2018). To this end, the role of taxation in developing 
countries like those in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) has been emphasized as an instrument for 
sustained economic growth and development (De Paepe and Dickinson 2014).   
Generally, since tax revenues are usually low, policymakers in SSA rely on foreign aid 
(official development and concessional loans) as well as miscellaneous sources such as 
seigniorage to fund developmental projects. It is for this reason that the 2002 Monterrey 
Consensus stressed the need to mobilize adequate resources domestically and internationally for 
development. For developing economies, long-term problems of debt sustainability associated 
with concessional loans, macroeconomic instability associated with seigniorage, and unreliable 
inflow of official development assistance mean that these economies are left with the options of 
improving tax revenue collection, or slowing down capital expenditure – the latter obviously 
with its own deleterious growth implications. For SSA, mobilizing adequate resources in the 
form of taxes is, thus, crucial for state building, the provision of public services, infrastructure 
development as well as the creation and reinforcement of ‘fiscal social contract’ between 
policymakers and citizens. For instance, the IMF recommends that developing countries raise the 
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level of tax to-GDP to at least 20 per cent (IMF 2018). Unfortunately, most of the countries in 
SSA still fall short of this target (De Paepe and Dickinson 2014).  Information gleaned from the 
2019 edition of OECD tax revenue statistics indicates that tax revenue performance in SSA rose 
marginally from 15 per cent of GDP in 2015 to only 15.1 per cent in 2018.  This, clearly, is one 
of the lowest in the world – falling short of Latin America and the Caribbean (22.8%), the OECD 
(34.1%), Asia and Pacific (24%), Europe (37.2%), and the world (26.2%). The low revenue 
performance means that aid from donor countries will have to rise significantly if SSA is to 
achieve the SDGs. It is in the light of this that donor countries committed to increasing their 
official development assistance up to 0.7 per cent of their GDP (OECD 2014).  
While policymakers in SSA can do little to change the structural drivers of tax revenue in 
the short-run, they can influence long-run tax revenue performance by revising economic 
policies, fighting corruption, and improving the efficiency of tax systems.  The bottom-line is that 
SSA countries can improve their tax efforts or reduce tax revenue instability by tackling 
structural and institutional bottlenecks (see, Ebeke and Ehrhart 2012). If concerted efforts are not 
made to improve the tax systems in SSA, the implications could be dire. It can further 
impoverish the masses, and above all, hamper inclusive growth efforts as it limits policymakers’ 
ability to allocate or redistribute resources equitably. A poor tax system can thus fuel poverty and 
inequality which entrenches the power of a narrow elite and sustain them in patterns of public 
policy and administration. In Figure 1, we present tax revenue-to-GDP across regions, putting 







Figure 41.1: Trend of Tax Revenue (%GDP) by Region (1990 - 2017) 
Source: Authors’ construct based on International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates, 2020 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that over the past decade, the only region SSA outperforms in terms of tax 
revenue mobilization is the Middle East and North Africa. It is also clear from Figure 1 that, 
since 2003, the SSA continues to remain within a performance range of 15.1 per cent and 16.8 
per cent.  This clearly shows a region with slow growth in tax revenue performance. The trend 
for SSA over the last two decades has not only been slow but unstable if compared to that of 
Europe and Central Asia, and the Latin America and Caribbean. Also, Figure 1 shows that, from 
2003 to 2017, SSA falls short of the performance by the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) by 
2 percentage points. More revealing is the fact that the LAC is a region with similar structural 
and institutional settings as that of the SSA suggesting that there are a number of structural and 
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tax revenue performance in SSA? In addition to the traditional drivers of tax revenue such as the 
depth of the informal sector, economic growth, trade, foreign aid, among others, we identify one 
macroeconomic issue, exchange rate volatility that affects tax revenue generation in SSA but 
remains unexplored. 
1.1 Exchange Rate Volatility and Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In SSA, some amount of tax revenue come from inter- and intra-regional trade. Among the key 
components of tax revenue (as a share of gross domestic product) is international trade taxes, 
which include import duties, export duties, profits of export or import monopolies, exchange 
profits, and exchange taxes. Theoretically, all these components of trade tax revenue are affected 
by trade policies – tariff and non-tariff policies. Aside these traditional factors affecting the flow 
of goods and services across borders are trade uncertainties. One of such uncertainties that has 
gained attention in the trade and finance literature in recent times is exchange rate volatility. 
Exchange rate volatility is the tendency of the real exchange rate to rise or fall sharply within a 
short period of time. This implies that exchange rate volatility can create uncertainty in 
macroeconomic policy formulation, investment decisions, and international trade flows. 
Evidence shows that for small open economies like those of SSA, the effect of exchange rate risk 
on trade is high (Obeng 2018; Wang and Barrett 2007; De Vita and Abbott 2004; Tchokote, 
Uche, and Agboola 2015).  
Further, the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade can be direct (through uncertainty 
and adjustment costs), and indirect (through its effect on the structure of output, investment, and 
government policy). The effect is however, dependent on the degree of risk aversion of trade 
players. De Grauwe (1988) argues that for risk neutral trade players, exchange rate uncertainty 
does not affect their decisions. Even in the case of risk-averse trade players, theory does not 
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allow one to conclude that exchange rate volatility leads to a reduction in cross-border trade as it 
depends on the magnitudes of the substitution and income effects. The former compels trade 
players to reduce trade participation while the latter lowers the expected total utility from trade 
compelling commodity arbitrageurs to devote more resources to trade in order to make up for 
revenue losses (Ofori et al. 2018). For import-dependent economies like those of SSA, exchange 
rate volatility can thus reduce the tempo of economic activities causing firms to raise their prices. 
The move, more often than not, results in drop in sales making it difficult for firms to meet their 
tax obligations. In fact, most businesses collapse in the process or layoff workers leaving to dire 
consequences for the economy. In Figure 2, we present the average exchange rate volatility and 
tax revenue performance in SSA. 
 
Figure 2: Trend of Average Exchange Rate Volatility and Tax Revenue (%GDP) in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(1984   – 2017) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on International Financial Statistics database, 2020 
 
 
It is evident from Figure 2 that from 1984 to 2002 where exchange rate volatility was downward 
–an indication of falling average risk, tax revenue rose steadily. Also, from 2003 to 2017 where 
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the average exchange rate volatility was largely high and persistent, tax revenue performance 
was generally low and unstable. This gives an indication of a possible drag effect from exchange 
rate volatility to tax revenue performance. This we reckon to be one of the ways in which SSA 
can raise tax revenue by 3-5 per cent of GDP (US$500 billion equivalent) as the IMF suggested 
in 2019. 
 
1.2 Chapter Objectives  
The implications of the substitution and income effects of exchange rate volatility on 
trade/investment means that exchange rate volatility can have both contemporaneous and long-
term effects on tax revenue. We thus contribute to the literature on two counts: (1) by 
determining the direct effect of exchange rate volatility on tax revenue performance in SSA, and 
(2) by exploring the existence or otherwise of an indirect pathway through which exchange rate 
volatility affects tax revenue in SSA. 
 
2.0 Literature Survey on Tax efforts and Tax Revenue Performance 
The literature provides some important drivers of tax revenue in SSA. Among others, these 
drivers comprise structural factors (such as sectoral contribution to GDP, trade liberalization, 
inflation, foreign aid, government expenditure, foreign direct investment), and institutional 
factors (corruption, political instability/risk and democratic accountability) (see, Castaneda and 
Pardinas 2012). For instance, as Morrissey (2015) observes, a large proportion of aid to 
developing countries is given directly to the government either in the form of project-specific 
support or budgetary support. This underscores the direct impact of foreign aid on expenditure, 
taxation, and borrowing behavior of policymakers in SSA. The impact of aid on tax efforts is 
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thus controversial in that: (1) aid in the form development assistance/grants can reduce tax 
efforts as it is substituted for tax revenue generation (Thornton 2014); and (2) aid in the form of 
concessional loans induces greater tax efforts and fiscal management due to repayment 
conditions attached to it (see, Cordella and Ulku 2007; Benedek et al. 2014). On sectoral 
contribution to tax revenue performance in SSA, the literature shows that the agricultural sector 
hinders tax efforts as the sector is highly informal (Chaudhry and Munir 2010; Emran and 
Stiglitz 2005). However, the industrial and service sectors contribute favorably to tax efforts as 
companies usually keep records of their activities making it easier to tax.  
Furthermore, the level of economic development is often regarded as one of the main 
reasons SSA is unable to generate adequate revenues for development. There is empirical 
evidence that rising levels of per capita income – an indicator for economic development matters 
for tax revenue performance. Rising per capita income signifies improved capacity of the masses 
to spend which improves the capacity of the state to levy and collect taxes (Teera and Hudson 
2004; Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng 2008). Aside the traditional argument that foreign direct 
investment affects tax revenue efforts of developing economies, there is also the  notion that 
trade liberalization depending on the form it takes can affect tax efforts (see, Zucman 2015). This 
stems from the argument that trade liberalization accelerates growth by enhancing productivity 
through the transfer of capital resulting in high employment and increased private spending (see, 
Ahmed and Muhammad 2010; Agbeyegbe et al. 2006). For instance, tax revenue may increase, 
provided that trade liberalization occurs through tariffication of quotas, eliminations of 
exemptions, reduction in tariff peaks, and improvement in customs procedure (Brafu-Insaidoo 
and Obeng 2008). Furthermore, liberalization in the form of tariff-cut can cause revenue losses 
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on the one hand, but can also amount to an increase in the volume of imports and, hence, 
increased trade tax revenue on the other hand.  
A number of research has identified institutional factors such as corruption, political risk, 
and democratic accountability as significant drivers of tax revenue generation (see, Bird et al. 
2008; Garcia and von Haldenwang 2016). For instance, Garcia and von Haldenwang (2016) 
argue that political regimes matter for tax performance – with full autocracies and full 
democracies collecting significantly higher shares than political regimes located between both 
margins. Particularly, Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) provide evidence to show that, in SSA, 
democracy induces revenue generation efforts.  One of the main impediments to tax efforts in 
SSA is widespread corruption which includes, but not limited to bribery, extortion, influence 
peddling, nepotism, fraud, and embezzlement (see, Klitgaard 1998; Chand and Moene 1997). 
There is a general consensus that a number of factors fuel fiscal corruption in SSA. These factors 
encompass complicated tax laws, undue discretionary power entrusted to tax administrators, the 
necessity for frequent contacts between taxpayers and tax officials, weak legal and judicial 
systems, lack of accountability and transparency in the tax administration, and low salaries in the 
public sector. This, in effect, incentivizes corrupt tax and custom officials who allocate a 
proportion of their working hours to: (1) collecting bribes in exchange for alleviating the tax 
burdens of taxpayers offering these bribes; and (2) complicating procedures for taxpayers who 
refuse to participate in the bribery scheme, thus, forcing them out of business, or into the 
informal sector. The end result is that investment is discouraged, economic growth is hampered 




3.1 Modeling Exchange Rate Volatility 
Unlike some macroeconomic variables, exchange rate volatility is not directly observed over 
time. The literature offers techniques such as the moving average, the arithmetic deviation, the 
standard deviation, and the Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) as ways of calculating exchange rate volatility. We opt for the GARCH (1,1) method 
put forward by Bollerslev (1990) since it allows variances of errors in the real effective exchange 
rate to be time dependent. To do this, we model the GARCH (1,1) process with the mean 
equation allowing for changes in the real effective exchange rate to be dependent on its lagged 
value as seen in equation (1). The error term from the estimated mean equation is normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance, ℎ𝑖𝑡. The GARCH (1,1) process is then specified with 
one ARCH term and one GARCH term (see, equation 2) ∆(𝑙𝑛EXH)𝑖𝑡  =  𝑐1 +  𝛽∆(𝑙𝑛EXH)𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡             (1) 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≈ N(0, ℎ𝑖𝑡) ℎ𝑖𝑡= 𝑐2 + 𝛼0𝑒𝑖,𝑡−12  +𝛼1ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1                                  (2) 
where: ∆(𝑙𝑛EXH)= log difference of the real effective exchange rate from period 𝑡 to 𝑡 − 1 ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = variance of the error term, 𝑒𝑖𝑡, capturing volatility  𝑒𝑖,𝑡−12 = the ARCH term. ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1= the GARCH term. 
The dependent variable, ℎ𝑖𝑡 , represents the conditional variance (volatility) while 𝛼0  and 𝛼1 




3.2 Empirical Strategy   
The empirical thrust of the chapter stems from the behavioral approach to tax revenue 
mobilization. The approach requires a number of preliminary tests – stationarity test, cross-
sectional dependence test, and cointegration test.  The essence of the cross-sectional dependence 
test is to ascertain whether the variables share similar developments across panels, providing the 
impetus to adopt one stationarity test or the other. Whereas the stationarity test is worthwhile as 
it provides evidence of the statistical properties of the series, the cointegration test provides 
evidence as to whether there is a cointegration among the variables. Turning our attention to the 
main empirical strategy, we follow the behavioral approaches advanced by Ofori et al. (2018) 
and Gaalya (2015). We specify two bivariate panel models to establish the link between 
exchange rate volatility and tax revenue; and exchange rate volatility and trade tax revenue as 
seen in equations (3) and (4) respectively. 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐼𝑡                                                                (3) 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐼𝑡                                                                 (4) 
 
Where  𝑇𝑇  denotes trade tax revenue, 𝐸𝑋𝑉 is exchange rate volatility, 𝜀𝐼𝑡  captures country-
specific effect and the error term. 𝑇𝑅 is tax-to-GDP ratio, 𝛿0 and 𝛿1 are the intercept and slope 
coefficient of the tax revenue – exchange rate volatility equation while 𝛽0  and 𝛽1 capture the 
intercept and slope coefficient of the trade tax revenue – exchange rate volatility equation.  
Next, in determining the effect of exchange rate volatility on tax revenue, we find the 
panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimation technique appropriate on three counts. 
First, the technique is able to capture both short-run and long-run effects. Second, the technique 
is efficient with large cross-sectional and short time periods, usually more than 20 years. Third, 
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the technique is appropriate irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are purely 
integrated at order zero or one. Following Pesaran et al.(2001a), we specify a heterogenous panel 
ARDL (ρ, 𝑞1 … . q𝑘) model as seen in equation 5.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖 + ∑ ∅𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗ρ𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗′q𝑗=0  X𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (5) 
where ‘ρ’ is the lag of the outcome variable and ‘q’ is the lags of the regressors; i = 1, 2, …., N is 
the number of cross-sections; t = 1, 2,.....,T captures the time dimension; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is 𝑘 × 1 vector of 
regressors; 𝛽𝑖𝑗′  is  𝑘 × 1 coefficient vectors;  ∅𝑖𝑗 is scalars; 𝛾𝑖  is the country-specific effect and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is error term. The next step is re-parameterizing equation (5) into an error-correction form in 
order to capture short-run to long-run speed of adjustment following a shock to (5) as seen in 
equation (6). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛿𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝑡) + ∑ ∅𝑖𝑗∗ ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗ρ−1𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗′∗q−1𝑗=0 ∆ X𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                (6) 
Where 𝛿𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗′q𝑗=01− ∑ ∅𝑖𝑗p𝑗=1  and  𝛼𝑖 = −(1 − 1 − ∑ ∅𝑖𝑗ρ𝑗=1 ) . The term (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛿𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝑡)  captures the 
long-run cointegrating relationship among the outcome variable and the regressors while ∆ is the 
first difference operator.  Also, 𝛿𝑖 captures the long-run elasticities with ∅𝑖𝑗 ∗ and 𝛽𝑖𝑗′∗ denoting the 
short-run elasticities of the lagged values of the outcome variable and regressors. For the sake of 
efficiency checks, we estimate our models based on the mean group (MG) and pooled mean 
group (PMG). First, we specify a baseline model on the drivers of tax revenue in SSA (see, 
equation 7). Finally, we specify the panel ARDL model on the hypothesised tax revenue – 




∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛿0𝑖 − 𝛿1𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿3𝑖𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿4𝑖𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 −𝛿5𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿6𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽1𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 +𝛽5𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                    (7)                            
 
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛿0𝑖 − 𝛿1𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿3𝑖𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿4𝑖𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 −𝛿5𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿6𝑖𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿7𝑖𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽1𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 +𝛽4𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽5𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (8) 
 
Where TR = Tax-to-GDP ratio; GPC = GDP per capita; INF = inflation; AGRIC = agricultural 
sector’s contribution to GDP; FDI is foreign direct investment; AID is foreign aid; EXV is 
exchange rate volatility; (EXV*lnOPEN) is exchange rate volatility and trade openness 
interaction. Also,  𝛿1𝑖 , 𝛿2𝑖 , 𝛿3𝑖 , 𝛿4𝑖 ,𝛿5𝑖 , 𝛿6𝑖 and  𝛿7𝑖 measure long-run elasticities; 𝛽1𝑖 , 𝛿2𝑖 , 𝛽3𝑖 , 𝛽4𝑖 ,  𝛽5𝑖 ,   𝛽6𝑖  and  𝛽7𝑖  measure the contemporaneous elasticities; while 𝛿0𝑖  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  capture 
country-specific intercepts and error term respectively.    
 
3.3 Variable Description, Justification and Data Sources 
Based on theoretical and empirical evidence, we use macrodata for the analyses. The chapter 
covers 21 SSA countries over a period spanning 33 years (1984 – 2017). The outcome variable, 
tax-to-GDP, is measured as the overall central government tax revenue as a ratio of GDP.  The 
variable of interest, exchange rate volatility, is generated. With the control variables, we consider 
trade openness since substantial flow of goods and services across borders are taxed. Trade 
openness is captured as the ratio of the sum of export and import to GDP (Gupta 2007). 
Similarly, per capita income matters for tax revenue as it suggests rising economic wellbeing of 
the populace which improves the central government’s capacity to levy and collect taxes 
(Chelliah 1971). Per capita income is measured as the ratio of national income to overall 
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population at 2011 purchasing power parity. One of the controversial ways of generating revenue 
has to do with inflation tax.  In low income countries, seigniorage is sometimes used to raise 
revenue for developmental purposes. This move puts the working class into an illusionary high-
income group benefiting central governments of inflation tax (see, Alavirad 2004). We capture 
inflation as the end-of-period consumer price index. Further, we control for the real sector of the 
economies in question as the growth of the service and industrial sectors are favorable to tax 
efforts since by law, firms keep records of their activities as compared to the agricultural sector 
which is largely subsistence (Karagöz 2013; Baunsgaard and Keen 2010; Teera and Hudson 
2004). We use the share of agricultural sector in GDP to control for the economic structure of the 
study area. Also, as Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) and Mahdavi (2008) argue, foreign aid can 
reduce tax efforts as it can be substituted for tax revenue therefore its inclusion in the models. 
Foreign aid is captured as net official development assistance inflows ($ billions). Also, foreign 
direct investment can boost the productive capacity of recipient countries and consequently tax 
revenue efforts (see, Reynolds and Wier 2016; Zucman 2015). Foreign direct investment is 
measured as net inflow of direct investment as a ratio of GDP.  
 
4.0 Results and Discussions 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
The presentation of the result starts with summary statistics, followed by the preliminary tests for 
stationarity, cointegration, and cross-sectional dependence. The summary statistics gives 
perspectives to the location and variability of the data (see, Table 1). For instance, the average 
tax-to-GDP ratio of SSA is a modest 16.9 per cent. Also, the average GDP per capita measured 
at 2011 purchasing power parity is US$2283.8. Further, the data shows that in SSA, the average 
16 
 
net official development assistant amounts to $ 6.49 trillion while the sectoral contributions of 
agriculture to GDP stands at 25 per cent. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables, 1984 - 2017 
Note: Std. Dev refers to Standard Deviation.  
Source: Authors’ Construct Based on Data from the International Financial Statistics and World 
Development Indicators, 2020. 
 
4.2 Evidence of Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Sub-Sahara Africa  
In Table 2, we provide evidence of the presence of exchange rate volatility in SSA via the 
GARCH (1, 1) technique. The magnitude of the ARCH and GARCH terms add up to 1 
suggesting high levels of volatility in the sub-region. Finally, with ARCH LM test statistics of 
0.189 and p-value of 0.671, we show the absence of serial correlation in the residuals of the real 
effective exchange rate series. 
Table 2: Evidence of Exchange Rate Volatility in Sub-Sahara Africa (1984 – 2017) 
 Coefficient Standard Error Z-score 
ARCH (1) 0.701*** 0.055 12.522 
GARCH (1) 0 .355*** 0.013 25.957 
Constant 1.209*** 0 .123 9.819 
ARCH (1) + GARCH (1) 1.056   
Note: Three asterisks (***) denotes 1% significance level. ARCH refers to Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity while GARCH denotes Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity. 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Tax Revenue 693 16.942 8.567 0. 905 58.407 
GDP Per Capita 693 2283.811 3297.985 193.861 20333.941 
Agricultural Sector 693 25.003 16.412 0.891 79.042 
Foreign Aid 693 6.490 8.400 -1.450 11.40 
Inflation 693 46.333 920.367 -35.836 24411.037 
Trade Openness 693 79.474 42.106 20.964 351.105 
Trade Taxes 693 0.355 0.522 -0.943 3.569 
Exchange Rate Volatility 693 -0.002 0.187 -1.372 1.922 
Foreign Direct Investment 693 3.626 9.092 -28.624 161.821 
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4.3 Cross-Sectional Dependence Test Results 
As advised by Pesaran (2004), we first test for cross-sectional dependence among the variables 
to determine whether the variables share similar developments in the SSA. There is strong 
empirical evidence to show that on a whole, the variables exhibit similar developments (see, 
Table 3). This suggests that shocks to these variables, for instance, instability in aid, would 
possibly have similar impacts in all the economies in this chapter.  
 Table 3: Results for Cross-Sectional Dependence Test in Sub-Sahara Africa, 1984 – 2017 
Note: A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks (**) at 5% level, and three 
asterisks (***) at 1% level. 𝐻0: cross-sectional independence among panel units against H1: cross-
sectional dependence among panel units. CD is Cross-sectional Dependence; Abs which computes the 
average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements of the cross-sectional correlation matrix of the 
residuals 
 
4.4 Panel Unit Root Test Results 
Per the results of the cross-sectional dependence test, we rely on the second generational unit 
root tests such as Cross-Sectionally Augmented Dickey Fuller (CADF) and Cross-Sectionally 
Augmented Im Pesaran (CIPS) tests to ascertain: (1) the stationarity properties of the variables; 
and (2), establish the absence of I(2) variables. This is essential as it establishes whether the 








Tax Revenue 4.496*** 0.053 0.363 
GDP Per Capita  6.072*** 0.072 0.175 
Inflation  54.327*** 0.644 0.750 
Trade Openness 11.323*** 0.134 0.380 
Agriculture 27.625*** 0.327 0.513 
Exchange Rate volatility 13.728*** 0.162 0.680 
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Table 4: Unit Root Test Results for the Variables at Levels 
A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks (**) at 5% level, and three asterisks 
(***) at 1% level. Both CADF & CIPS test the 𝐻0: All panels contain unit root against  𝐻1: Some panels are 
stationary. CADF means Cross-sectionally Augmented Dickey–Fuller while CIPS refers to Cross-sectionally 
Augmented Im Pesaran Shin. 
 
Table 5: Unit Root Test Results for the Variables at First Difference 
A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks (**) at 5% level, and three asterisks 
(***) at 1% level. Both CADF & CIPS test the  𝐻0: all panels contain unit root against  𝐻1: Some panels 
are stationary. CADF means Cross-sectionally Augmented Dickey–Fuller while CIPS refers to Cross-
sectionally Augmented Im Pesaran Shin. 
 
The results from the stationarity tests at levels and first difference are reported in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively. But for inflation, trade openness, and exchange rate volatility, all the variables are 
stationary at levels. However, after first difference, all the variables containing unit root become 






Tax Revenue -0.179 -2.293** 0.508 -2.526 
GDP Per Capita  -7.432*** -4.280*** -6.141*** -4.524*** 
Inflation 6.084 -1.310 3.508 -2.211 
Trade Openness 1.087 -1.667 0.414 -2.271 
Agriculture -2.453*** -2.363** -1.747** -2.771** 
Foreign Direct Investment -2.721*** -3.243*** -3.044*** -4.065*** 
Foreign Aid -5.003*** -3.359*** -4.190*** -3.626*** 
Exchange Rate Volatility 3.233 -0.843 4.390 -1.313 
Variables  Constant  Constant   and Trend 





Tax Revenue -10.443*** -5.517*** -7.814*** -5.543*** 
GDP Per Capita -17.859*** -6.146*** -16.600 -6.358*** 
Inflation -5.500*** -4.311*** -4.154*** -4.564*** 
Trade Openness -11.314*** -5.756*** -9.505*** -5.883*** 
Agriculture -13.511*** -5.463*** -12.026*** -5.535*** 
Foreign Direct Investment -14.846*** -5.985*** -12.982*** -6.145*** 
Foreign Aid -12.519*** -5.958*** -10.200*** -6.078*** 
Exchange Rate Volatility -2.413*** -2.847*** -1.194 -3.124*** 
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stationary. This suggests that the variables are only integrated at levels or first difference. The 
absence of I(2) variables means that the Panel ARDL technique can be applied. 
4.5 Panel Cointegration Test Results  
To establish whether there is cointegration among the variables, we apply the Westerlund (2007) 
cointegration test. The strength of this test is that, it allows for heterogeneous vectors and hence, 
do not impose a common-restriction factor. More importantly, the test is normally distributed 
and accommodative of unit specific short-run dynamics, trend, slope parameters and cross-
sectional dependence. The Westerlund (2007) test of cointegration relies on the group mean and 
panel statistics from the cross-section. The group mean statistics (𝐺𝜏 and Gα) test the alternative 
hypothesis of cointegration for at least one cross-sectional unit in the panel whereas the panel 
statistics (𝑃𝜏 and Pα) tests the alternative hypothesis of cointegration for the whole cross-section. 
Table 6 reports the results of the panel cointegration test.  
Table 6: Westerlund Cointegration Test Results for Cointegration in the Series 
Cointegration Statistics Values Z-value 𝐺𝜏 -2.633* -1.505 
Gα -7.735 2.882 𝑃𝜏 -12.740*** -3.499 
Pα -11.220** -1.710 
Note: A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks (**) at 5% level, and three 
asterisks (***) at 1% level. 𝐺𝜏 and Gα are group mean statistics while 𝑃𝜏 and Pα refer to panel  
 
Results from Table 6 is premised on the null hypotheses of no cointegration among the variables 
from both the group mean and panel statistics. However, it is evident from the level of 
significance that there is strong cointegration among the variables. 
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4.6 Baseline Results on Drivers of Tax Revenue in Sub-Sahara Africa 
The interpretation of the baseline results in Table 7 is based on the Hausman (1978) test on the 
efficiency of the MG and PMG estimates.  
 
Table 7: Baseline Results on Drivers of Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa (1984 – 2017). 
[Dependent Variable: ln (Tax-to- Gross Domestic Product)] 
 MG   MG  PMG  PMG  
Variables Tax-to-GDP 
(SR) 






















































Exchange Rate Volatility  – – – – 
Exchange Rate Volatility*Trade Openness – – – – 










Number of Panels 20 20 20 20 
Hausman 𝑋2statistic   1.161  
[P-value]   0.884  
Note: All variables with the exception of exchange rate volatility are measured in natural logs. Values in 
parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks (**) 
at 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at 1% level. MG is Mean Group; PMG is Panel Mean Group; SR is 




We find that the growth of SSA economies proxied by per capita income induces tax revenue 
performance both in the short-run and long-run. The result is however, only significant in the 
long-run. The result shows that a 1 per cent increase in per capita income improves tax revenue 
performance by 0.1 per cent. The finding supports the argument by Gupta (2007) and Brafu-
Insaidoo and Obeng (2008) that economic growth improves the capacity of the populace to spend 
and thus the capacity of policymakers to levy and collect taxes. Further, there is evidence that in 
SSA, trade openness reduces tax revenue performance in the short-run while it improves tax 
revenue mobilization in the long-run.  Intuitively, tax revenue performance falls in the short-run 
following the removal of tariffs however, in the long-run, tax revenue performance increases due 
to improved tax revenue receipts from indirect taxes (see, Gupta 2007). In addition, we show that 
foreign aid is harmful to tax revenue generation in SSA in both the short-run and long-run 
implying that development assistance is used as a substitute for tax revenue in SSA (see, Bird et 
al. 2008; Gupta 2007). As expected, inflation proved favorable to tax revenue performance in 
SSA. There is empirical evidence that in the long-run, a 1 per cent increase in inflation levels 
improves revenue generation by 0.02 per cent. Raising tax revenue through seigniorage is not 
surprising in developing economies where fiscal authorities exercise domineering powers over 
monetary authorities. However, the macroeconomic instability associated with this approach 
makes it an uneconomical way of generating revenue. Also, in conformity with our apriori 
expectation, we find that the agricultural sector supresses tax revenue generation both in the 
short-run and long-run. The predominant informal agricultural sector of SSA is difficult to tax as 
records of activities are not usually kept (Chaudhry and Munir 2010; Gupta 2007). Moreover, 
there is empirical evidence to show that the short-run and long-run effects of foreign direct 
investment on tax revenue mobilization in SSA are negative. The effect is however pronounced 
22 
 
in the short-run relative to the long-run. Overall, there is a 20 per cent adjustment speed towards 
long-run equilibrium following a shock to the model.   
 
4.7 Bivariate Results  
The essence of the bivariate estimation is to show if there is empirical evidence that exchange 
rate volatility is deleterious to tax revenue performance.  
Table 8: Bivariate Results on Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on Tax (%GDP), and Trade Taxes 
 [Dependent Variable in (1) & (2): ln (Trade Tax-to-Gross Domestic Product)] 
 [Dependent Variable in (3) & (4): ln (Tax-to-Gross Domestic Product)] 
Note: A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks (**) at 5% level, and three 
asterisks (***) at 1% level. SR is Short-run while LR is Long-Run 
The results show a strong negative effect of exchange rate volatility on both trade tax revenue 
and overall tax revenue in SSA. The effect is however pronounced on overall tax revenue than it 
is on trade tax revenue.  
 
4.7.1 Contemporaneous Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on Tax Revenue in SSA  
The short-run results show that exchange rate volatility is detrimental to tax revenue 
performance (see, Table 9). The result has both theoretical and empirical justification. 
Variables Trade Taxes  
SR 






Exchange Rate Volatility -0.163*** -0.168*** -0.382*** -0.351*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.089) (0.089) 
Constant 3.325***  3.350***  4.432*** 4.278*** 
 (0.227) (0.238) (0.424) (0.436) 
Observations 693 693 693 693 
Hausman 25.73  25.20  
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  
Number of Panel 20 20 20 20 
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Theoretically, exchange rate volatility can cause risk-averse international trade players to reduce 
the volume of transaction thereby causing revenue shortfalls.  
Table 9: Main Results on Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. [Dependent Variable: ln (Tax-to- Gross Domestic Product)] 
   MG   MG    PMG    PMG  















































































–   
Constant 20.923 
(13.153) 
     
– 
     
–   
 4.204** 
(2.009) 
      
– 
      
–   
Number of Panels     
20 
    
20 
 
     20 
     
20 
Hausman 𝑋2statistic      
– 
     
– 
 
   8.551 
      
– 
[P-value] – –    0.382 – 
Note: All variables with the exception of exchange rate volatility are measured in natural logs. Values in 
the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at 10% level, two asterisks 
(**) at 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at 1% level. MG is Mean Group; PMG is Panel Mean Group; SR 
is Short-run, and LR is Long-Run 
 
Further, we provide empirical evidence to show that, in the short-term, foreign direct investment 
is harmful to revenue generation in SSA. The result indicates that a 1 per cent increase in inflows 
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of direct investment results in a 0.3 per cent shortfall in tax revenue generation though there is no 
empirical support for it. Plausibly, this is due to tax holidays these firms enjoy or transfer pricing 
strategies these firms adopt (see, Reynolds and Wier, 2016). The economic structure of SSA has 
often been considered as one of the main reasons behind the sub-region’s low revenue generation 
efforts. Though there is no empirical evidence for this result, the sign indicates that the growth of 
the agricultural sector is harmful to tax revenue generation. One variable that has generated 
debate in terms of its effect on tax revenue performance has been trade openness. Though there 
is no empirical support, we find a negative effect of trade openness on tax revenue generation. 
This is plausibly due to the gradual reduction in tariffs, weak border controls or corruption at the 
borders. In addition, we show that economic growth is tax revenue inducing. Generally, an 
expansion of the economy creates additional employment and expenditure which further fuel 
both direct and indirect revenue generations (Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng 2008).   
 
4.7.2 Long-Run Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on Tax Revenue in SSA  
In line with our short-run results, exchange rate volatility hinders tax revenue performance also 
in the long-run (see, Table 9). The result is statistically significant at 10 per cent suggesting that 
a 1 per cent increase in exchange rate volatility results in 0.06 per cent shortfall in tax revenue. 
The theoretical underpinning of the result is that, in small open economies like those of SSA, 
short-term trade risk posed by exchange rate volatility causes trade players or investors to 
substitute domestic markets for foreign markets. The end result is the direct loss of trade tax 
revenue as prolonged planning and adjustment cost results in the folding up or floundering of 
businesses. Further, we find that, there is an indirect pathway from exchange rate volatility to tax 
revenue performance through trade openness. We provide strong empirical support to show that 
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given exchange rate volatility, the more SSA liberalizes trade, the more the region loses tax 
revenue.  𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅 = 0.0435𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶 + 0.0848𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹 − 0.1383𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 0.0979𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶 −0.0494𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 0.1082𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷 − 6.4984𝐸𝑋𝑉 + 0.0379(𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁)   
𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) = −0.1383 + 0.0379𝐸𝑋𝑉, from the descriptive statistics, 𝐸𝑋𝑉 = -0.0023 
𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) = −0.1383 + 0.0379(−0.0023) 
𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) = −0.1383 
Thus, in the presence of exchange rate volatility, policies aimed at opening up SSA economies to 
trade by 1 per cent lead to a decline in tax revenue performance by approximately 0.14 per cent.  
We test for and find statistical evidence for this interaction term at 1 per cent (F-statistics is 
32.727; p-value is 0.000).  The result is not farfetched per the structure of the economies of SSA 
as trade in SSA revolve around commodity arbitrage in which trade players hardly make use of 
hedging facilities or forward contracts. The long-term effect of persistent exchange rate risk is 
high planning and adjustment cost which have dampen effect on trade and indirect taxes.  This, 
in effect, hinders tax revenue mobilization in SSA.  
           Again, we sought to determine the extent to which exchange rate volatility affect tax 
revenue given the current state of openness to trade in SSA.   𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅 = 0.0435𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶 + 0.0848𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹 − 0.1383𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 0.0979𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶 −0.0494𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 0.1082𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷 − 6.4984𝐸𝑋𝑉 + 0.0379(𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁)   𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −6.4984 + 0.0132𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, from the data, 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 2.2729 𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −6.4984 + 0.0379(2.2729) 
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𝜕(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −6.4122        
From the net effect, we show that, given the current state of trade openness in SSA, a 1 per cent 
increase in exchange rate volatility results in a 0.064 per cent decline in tax revenue 
mobilization. The evidence for this interaction term is an F-statistics of 32.727 and a p-value of 
0.000. Also, there is empirical evidence to show that trade openness has a harmful effect on tax 
revenue mobilization in SSA. The result suggests that a 1 per cent increase in trade openness 
results in approximately 0.14 per cent reduction in tax revenue generation. Plausibly, the regional 
integration laws of free movement of goods and services, and corruption at the various ports and 
custom units in SSA account for this. The finding corroborates that of Gupta (2007). The results 
suggest that given that the economies of SSA adhere to regional trade laws, then fiscal 
authorities of the various countries must brace themselves for tax revenue shortfalls. To address 
this, policymakers can adopt a gradual approach to the implementation of free trade; discourage 
border corruption through provision of better conditions of service; and ensure the prosecution of 
corrupt officials. Also, we provide strong empirical support for the argument that the growth of 
the agricultural sector has a suppressing effect on tax revenue mobilization. This partly explains 
the resolve on the part of policymakers in SSA to industrialize their economies since 
manufacturing enterprises/companies are easier to tax (see, Agbeyegbe et al. 2006; Ahmed and 
Muhammad 2010). The implication of this is that the establishment of new enterprises, 
sustainability of existing firms, and support for manufacturing industries has the potency of 
improving tax revenue performance. Moreover, there is evidence that foreign direct investment 
has a harmful effect on tax revenue generation in the long-run. In conformity to the finding of 
Beck and Chaves (2011), we show that a 1 per cent increase in inflow of direct investment 
reduces tax revenue performance by 0.1 per cent. Also, we find that the growth of SSA 
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economies is tax revenue inducing. We show that for every 1 per cent improvement in the 
economic performance of SSA, tax revenue rises by approximately 0.04 per cent. The result 
leans itself to the argument that rising levels of economic growth is associated with higher levels 
of private spending (Teera and Hudson 2004; Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng 2008). This shows the 
need for policymakers in SSA to strive to expand their economies. Also, inflation proved to be 
tax revenue inducing suggesting that printing of monies, a common means of raising revenue 
fuels inflation tax in SSA (see, Alavirad 2003).   
 
5.0 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we looked at tax revenue performance of 21 SSA countriesi from 1984 to 2017. 
Like other developing regions of the world, the SSA faces a number of structural and 
institutional constraints in its tax mobilization efforts. In this chapter, we contribute to 
knowledge by looking at how a major risk factor to trade and investment – exchange rate 
volatility – affects tax revenue generation in a region where forward contracts and hedging 
facilities are rarely used. Recognizing the fact that theory posits both short-run and long-run 
effects of exchange rate volatility on trade and tax revenue, we rely on a heterogenous panel 
ARDL estimation technique to estimate the pathways through which exchange rate volatility 
affect tax revenue. First, we find that exchange rate volatility has a direct deleterious effect on 
tax revenue performance in SSA. Second, we establish the presence of an indirect pathway of 
exchange rate volatility to tax revenue performance through trade openness. Therefore, 
stabilizing the real effective exchange rate is crucial to improving revenue generation in SSA. 
We therefore recommend that monetary authorities in SSA intensify efforts to reduce exchange 
rate volatility. Further, we recommend that monetary authorities (Central Banks) in SSA 
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collaborate with financial institutions to provide trade players affordable forward contracts or 
hedging facilities. Lastly, we recommend that policymakers in SSA adopt a gradual approach 
when signing on to trade liberalization agreements.  
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